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The Gambia submitted an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 11
November 2019 against the Republic of the Union of Myanmar for acts of genocide
committed against the Rohingya people. The proceedings have been initiated in
application of the Genocide Convention of 1948 which both countries have ratified.
They have also accepted the ICJ’s jurisdiction provided for therein under article IX.
The Rohingya constitute a minority group which lives in the Rakhine state in the
west of Myanmar. They have been subject to persecutions, including the denial of
their Myanmar citizenship, for quite a long time. The Gambian application originates
from the situation which started from October 2016 when Myanmar decided to
undertake a number of clearance operations in Rohingya villages, causing the
deportation of hundreds of thousands of people into the neighbouring state of
Bangladesh (Application, paras. 47-48). A second wave of clearance operations
took place from August 2017 and was allegedly more brutal than the previous one
(Application, paras. 69 and 75). According to The Gambia, the military and security
forces of Myanmar executed a planned policy of destruction of the Rohingya people,
in a whole or in part, because of their ethnic or racial identity and Muslim religious
belief (Application, paras. 27, 29-31). Genocidal acts for which The Gambia has
requested the ICJ to establish Myanmar’s responsibility include mass killings, rapes
and other acts of sexual violence and the systematic destruction by fire of villages
with victims locked inside burning houses (Application, para. 6). The Gambia has
also applied for the indication of provision measures before a decision on the merits.
The proceedings have been initiated the support of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation.
This case raises several important legal issues. Some relate to the plurality of roads
to accountability for the Rohingya nightmare (Rachel Khoo), and how they can
complement each other. Others concern the establishment of the ICJ’s jurisdiction
as it is not entirely clear that a dispute exists between both countries, and the test
for the indication of provisional measures (Thomas Van Poecke, Marta Hermez and
Jonas Vernimmen). Another problem is the extent to which the applicant can request
reparation measures for victims while he has not himself suffered a direct prejudice
(Dimitrios A. Kourtis). The Gambia is rather relying on its right to ensure the respect
for collective interests enshrined in the Genocide Convention.
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The present post turns around a different and hypothetical question. What might be
the incidence of an ICJ decision establishing Myanmar’s responsibility for genocide
on ensuring the criminal accountability of individual perpetrators? The post gives
an insight into the penal options which might be available for Myanmar in this
regard. It also explores the possible involvement of the UN Security Council in the
matter should Myanmar disregard the expected ICJ decision. Before all of that, it is
important to say something on the link between the said ICJ decision and criminal
accountability.
The link between the expected ICJ decision and individual criminal
accountability
The ICJ is not a criminal court. It decides on state responsibility. However, this
does not mean that an ICJ decision cannot have some connections with criminal
accountability. To some extent, the ICJ can decide on criminal law issues in the
course of a case against a state. Examples of proceedings involving African
countries are many in this regard, such as in Belgium v. Senegal (2012), Congo
Brazzaville v. France (2003), Djibouti v. France (2008), and Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Belgium (2002). The ICJ does not make an exception at the international
arena. The case is well known before international human rights courts doing
international criminal law by other means (see Alexandra Huneeus).
The Gambian application is therefore another opportunity for the ICJ to decide
on criminal issues through the rules on state responsibility. This is plain from the
reading of the Gambian application as it is based on alleged violations of a penal
international instrument, the Genocide Convention. More specifically, Myanmar
is brought before the ICJ for, among others, the commission of genocide and
the failure to punish individual perpetrators (Application, paras. 2 and 111). This
widely justifies the relief sought by The Gambia that the ICJ declares that Myanmar
“must ensure that persons committing genocide are punished by a competent
tribunal, including before an international penal tribunal, as required by articles I and
VI” (Application, para.112) of the Genocide Convention. If this is done, it is important
to recall that the ICJ judgment will be binding on both litigant states.
There are benefits for the ICJ to decide on such criminal issues. In fact, the case
appears to be the only viable way to provide relief to victims, thereby compensating
for the shortcomings of the existing external roads to criminal accountability. First,
the ICC is not competent to try those who are responsible for criminal conducts that
have occurred entirely on the territory of Myanmar, which is not a state party and
has not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. As the ICC decided in its Decisions of 6
September 2018 (at paras. 64, 71, 72 and 73) and 14 November 2019 (at paras.
120 and 124), its jurisdiction is limited only to criminal conducts of which a part
at least has occurred on the territory of a state party, that is, mainly Bangladesh
where many Rohingya people have reportedly fled. Myanmar would then be obliged,
if it loses the case and is ordered to provide the relief sought by The Gambia, to
punish those individual perpetrators through the means at its disposal, including its
domestic criminal law. Second, it is self-evident that criminal prosecutions by third
states on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction, like in Argentina where
a complaint has been deposited on behalf of victims by a human rights organization
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(Rachel Khoo), do not have great chances of success. The major obstacle would
stem from the lack of cooperation of Myanmar, not only for the mere completion
of investigations by foreign prosecutors, but also in the extradition of suspects.
Additionally, contestations such as those which have proliferated against universal
jurisdiction, mainly from African states (see here), may arise again. This is the case
with immunities of state officials before foreign criminal jurisdictions. Another issue
would be the duty to respect the sovereignty of a foreign country by refraining from
prosecuting its incumbent military, civil and political leadership, particularly if such
prosecutions are conducted in absentia.
After all, it remains to be seen how Myanmar could act to give effect to the expected
ICJ’s decision and punish alone individual perpetrators of genocide against the
Rohingya minority group.
The potential criminal options for Myanmar after the expected ICJ’s decision
If Myanmar is found responsible for genocide against the Rohingya and ordered
to try the individual perpetrators, the question is how it must comply with the ICJ’s
decision. Two options would be available.
First, perpetrators can be prosecuted and judged before domestic courts and
tribunals of Myanmar. However, for this option to be effective, there would be a need
to introduce new domestic legislation into the legal system of Myanmar, which is
apparently lacking today. The Gambia has anticipated on this problem. It has made
a request to the ICJ to find and declare that Myanmar had violated its obligations
under the Genocide Convention by failing to enact the necessary legislation to give
effect to this treaty (Application, paras.111 and 112). The delay which may take the
process of adopting this new legislation could serve as another alibi not to prosecute
the individual perpetrators in due time. Such a default of judicial promptness would
run against the interests of justice; in this case, the availability of evidence and the
protection of the rights of victims who might be waiting for reparations as a result of
those municipal criminal trials. Therefore, this first option is less realistic as those
who have perpetrated genocide under the state umbrella may lack the political will
to leave courts and tribunals of Myanmar the necessary independence for their own
punishment
Second, Myanmar can decide to accept the ICC jurisdiction in accordance with
article 12 (3) of the Rome Statute. This option of delegated jurisdiction is based
on the fact that the lack of adequate domestic legislation to prosecute genocide
constitutes a case of Myanmar’s incapacity to exercise its primary jurisdiction over
the crime. However, again, that would be very easy only in theory. Nothing indicates
now that Myanmar will be willing to choose such an option. It may not participate in
the Gambian proceedings before the ICJ and finally disregard the latter’s decision.
The challenging question then arises as to the reaction of The Gambia, on the one
hand, for it has a tangible interest to have Myanmar comply with the expected ICJ
decision, and, on the other hand, the international community, which cannot tolerate
that such an odious crime of genocide goes unpunished. In this context, the Security
Council would become the last resort.
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The involvement of the UN Security Council as the final resort
There are two ways through which the Security Council may get involved in the
enforcement of Myanmar’s obligations after the ICJ has delivered its expected
judgment on the Gambian application. First, this may be by way of article 94(2)
of the UN Charter which entitles The Gambia to have recourse to the Security
Council which then may “make recommendation or decide upon measures to be
taken to give effect to the judgment”. Second, the Security Council can get involved
if it is seized by any of its member states or any UN member or the Secretary-
General in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter. The situation of
genocide could be dealt with as a threat to international peace and security. It is
self-evident that the commission of such an international crime and the spread of its
consequences in neighbouring countries reach the threshold to allow the Security
Council to take action on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.
As to the measures that the Security Council can take, there are two main
possibilities, if Myanmar does not organise criminal prosecutions alone. First, the
Security Council can impose, on the basis of Chapter VII, a duty on Myanmar
to extradite its nationals to a third state which has initiated proceedings against
the suspects in application of universal jurisdiction. The imposition on a state of
an obligation to extradite its own nationals to a third state will not be new. A past
example is known with the Lockerbie case (SC Res.748 (1992) of 31 March 1992,
para.1). Second, the Security Council may choose to refer the situation to the ICC
Prosecutor. This would expand the ICC jurisdiction over criminal acts committed in
the territory of Myanmar. In this context, judicial efficacy would be enhanced due to
the combination with the territorial jurisdiction which the ICC has already ascertained
in respect of criminal conducts of which a part at least has occurred in neighbouring
countries to Myanmar, which are states parties to the Rome Statute. The process of
ensuring criminal accountability will be strengthened.
In any case, an obstacle to the road to individual criminal accountability still persists.
In fact, it is not evident that a Security Council resolution is easy to adopt to that
effect, without being opposed by a veto of one of the permanent member states. The
question which needs to be debated is whether in such a context of commission of
genocide, the use of veto power could be consistent with international law. In other
words, would a permanent member state which decides to veto a Security Council
resolution taking measures to the effect of ensuring the punishment of individual
perpetrators of genocide violate international law? The question deserves a more
profound discussion especially if the ICJ finds Myanmar to be in breach of the
Genocide Convention with the genocidal acts then already established by a court.   
 
Dr. Balingene Kahombo is a fellow with the Berlin Potsdam Research Group “The
International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?”.
 
- 4 -
Cite as: Balingene Kahombo, “The Gambia and the Rohingya’s nightmare:
which opportunity for individual criminal accountability after the ICJ’s
decision against Myanmar for genocide?”, 28 November 2019.
- 5 -
